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Representation, Participation, and Development: 
Lessons from Small Industry in Latin America* 
 




Although it has become accepted as a matter of course that small firms are important for 
economic development and there exists an abundant literature on small enterprise promotion, 
very little attention is given to understanding the factors that affect small firms’ capacity to 
participate in politics. Filling this gap is important, for supporting small firms is not a 
technical choice but rather the outcome of political processes involving conflicts between 
actors with competing interests. In the simplest terms, representation affects policy, so anyone 
concerned with small enterprise development needs to consider the process by which small 
firms can secure representation.  
This paper addresses this political vacuum, analysing the capacity of small industrialists to 
construct durable mechanisms of representation. Emphasis is placed on representation outside 
of the electoral realm. Using Stepan’s distinction between “civil society,” where interest 
groups and social movements articulate their interests, and “political society,” the arena that 
hosts formal contestation among parties over policymaking authority, the analysis here is 
focused on civil society. 1 Rather than focusing on political parties, attention is paid to the 
aggregation and articulation of actors’ interests through business associations.  
The analysis is presented in two stages. The first section presents a framework for analysing 
small industry politics. By drawing attention to the core characteristics that define small firms 
as political actors, I set forth an explanation for why representation may be difficult, and I 
highlight the key issues at stake: the importance of formal organisation, the difficulties of 
small firm collective action, the critical role of the state, and the unavoidable tensions 
between dependence, autonomy, and political marginalisation. 
I then illustrate these points with a comparative analysis of small industry representation in 
post-war Latin America. I focus on the politics of small industry representation in Mexico, 
Argentina, and Brazil. Each ‘case’ consists of two sub-cases, the first corresponding to the 
period after World War II until the late 1970s or early 1980s, the second corresponding to the 
contemporary period in which all three countries have undergone democratisation in the 
context of implementing neoliberal economic policies. 
                                                 
* This paper is based on, and includes extensive material from, Kenneth C. Shadlen, Democratization Without 
Representation: The Politics of Small Industry in Mexico, University Park: Penn State University Press, 2004. 
See http://www.psupress.org/books/titles/0-271-02391-0.html (or in the UK: http://www.eurospanonline.com/ ). 
Some of the research for Chapter 6 of the book was funded by the Crisis States Programme, and I wish to thank 
the CSP for the generous support. I also wish to thank the participants at the DESTIN/CSP workshop in October 
2003 for helpful feedback. 
1 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1988, Chapter 1. 
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The conclusion extracts the main lessons from the cases and ties the case studies to the 
framework set out above. I then link the issues of representation and participation to the 
broader issue of small enterprise development. 
Most importantly, the analysis points to the importance of the state, and state institutions more 
generally, in helping weak actors overcome barriers to collective action and providing 
nourishment for organisational development. And the analysis speaks to the fundamental 
tensions that weak actors confront, between autonomy and representation: dependence on the 
state can distort interest representation, but the absence of the state hardly appears to improve 
representation. We need to distinguish between the state as a source of political control and 
the state as a resource that may allow weak actors to overcome their basic political handicaps 
and be integrated into local and national politics.  
Before proceeding, some brief points of definition and clarification are in order. I classify 
firm sizes based on number of employees: micro firms are those with up to fifteen employees, 
small with 16-100 employees, medium with 101-250 employees, and large with more then 
251 employees. I use the term ‘small’ to refer to micro, small, and medium-sized businesses – 
the whole set of firms with up to 250 employees.  
 
 
I. The Challenges of Small Industry Representation 
In considering the challenges of small industry representation, it is important to begin by 
noting the economic and political characteristics that distinguish small firms. This section 
begins by highlighting a set of basic size-based economic differences among firms. It then 
examines the core attributes that define small industry as a political actor, focusing on 
heightened obstacles to collective action. With the distinguishing characteristics presented, we 
can then turn to the implications for representation in the context of changing political and 
economic environments.  
 
Size and the Importance of Representation 
Several economic and political characteristics distinguish small firms. Relative to larger 
businesses, small firms generally have minimal access to credit and technology, they 
ordinarily operate on less product and market information, their owners and managers often 
lack critical administrative and professional skills, and they frequently lack the resources to 
train (and retrain) their employees. The reduced scale of operations for small firms contributes 
to liquidity problems, as factories need to run at closer to full capacity to meet customer 
demand, and small firms also often find themselves in disadvantageous positions bargaining 
with suppliers and purchasers.  
These differences in resources and capacities generate distinct interests between small and 
large firms on a variety of public policy issues. Small and la rge firms typically have clashing 
orientations towards direct foreign investment, for example, as weaker firms with limited 
access to credit and technology lack the ability to associate with multinationals via joint 
ventures and integration into transnational production chains. Differential access to credit and 
technology also conditions firms’ capacity to enter into foreign markets and their capacity to 
adjust to increased import competition in the domestic market. In short, the range of feasible 
adjustment options – not just increasing competitiveness by improving quality but also 
moving into new products, finding new markets, and seeking joint ventures – is reduced by 
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size. And because smaller firms depend to a greater degree on domestic sales, small and large 
firms typically have conflicting positions on macroeconomic policies that affect domestic 
purchasing power. Size, thus, is important; and it is particularly important in developing 
economies, where capital is scarce, credit markets are generally shallow, technological 
innovation externally driven, and degrees of industrial integration typically lower. 
The distinct and often contradictory interests of small and large firms makes it important that 
a specific representative exist to advocate on behalf of small firms. Without such a 
representative, where small firms are integrated into business organisations created and 
controlled by larger firms, for example, their distinct interests are likely to be neglected and 
subordinated. To be sure, most business organisations maintain that they act in the interest of 
small firms. Yet representation has to entail more than noting the potential positive 
externalities of a preferred policy – that what is good for big firms may also be good for small 
firms as well. The crux of the issue is who will defend the interests of small firms when their 
interests conflict with big business. 
 
A Third ‘Logic of Collective Action’ 
Departing from Olson’s famous statement on collective action, 2 much of the literature on 
business collective action has sought to distinguish capitalists’ modality of organisation from 
that of workers.3 Yet many of the attributes that are claimed to broadly distinguish ‘business’ 
do not apply to small firms. It is necessary to distinguish the organisation of small business 
from the organisation of both big business and labour. We can refer, in the broadest sense, to 
a third logic of collective action. 
In comparing the logics of collective action for different actors, it is useful to make 
assessments along two axes – the relative importance of formal organisation for a group to 
defend its interests, and the relative capacity of a group to organise. Small firms are like 
workers, in that their individual weakness means that they rely on collective representation 
through formal organisations more than large firms do. At the same time, and despite this 
heightened importance of organisation, collective action is relatively more difficult for small 
firms. 
Because small industrialists (and workers) ordinarily lack the resources to defend their 
interests individually and informally through the market, they rely on formal organisations to 
a greater degree for representation. The owners of large firms can often do without formal 
organisations, because they are more likely to gain individualised access to policymakers, and 
                                                 
2 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965. 
3 Claus Offe & Helmut Wiesenthal, ‘Two Logics of Collective Action: Theoretical Notes on Social Class and 
Organizational Form’, Political Power and Social Theory, 1 (1980), pp. 67-115; John R. Bowman, Capitalist 
Collective Action: Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in the Coal Industry, New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; Wolfgang Streeck, ‘Interest Heterogeneity and Organizing Capacity: Two Class Logics of 
Collective Action’, Estudio/Working Paper 1990/2. Centro de Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Madrid, 
Spain, 1990; Frans van Waarden, ‘Two Logics of Collective Action? Business Associations as Distinct from Trade 
Unions: The Problems of Associations of Organisations’, in Dieter Sadowski and Otto Jacobi (eds), Employers’ 
Associations in Europe: Policy and Organisation , Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991; Franz Traxler, 
‘Business Associations and Labor Unions in Comparison: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical Findings on Social 
Class, Collective Action and Associational Organizability’, British Journal of Sociology, 44:4 (December 1993), pp. 
673-691; William G. Roy & Rachel Parker-Gwin, ‘How Many Logics of Collective Action?’ Theory and 
Society, 28:2 (April 1999), pp. 203-237; Jeffrey Haydu, ‘Two Logics of Class Formation? Collective Identities 
among Proprietary Employers, 1880-1900’, Politics & Society, 27:4 (December 1999), pp.507-527. 
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their market power often places them in positions to collude informally by establishing 
cartels. Furthermore, since large firms’ individual investment decisions reverberate 
throughout local, regional, and sometimes even national economies, government authorities 
are more likely to watch out for their interests. 
To indicate large firms’ reduced dependence on formal organisation is not to suggest that they 
do not act collectively. Societies throughout the world are full of business organisations. Yet 
establishing associations is but one mechanism by which actors can defend their interests. 
Collective action should be thought of as a second-best solution: most actors would prefer 
individual strategies, so to avoid coordination problems. The key point is that the feasibility of 
an individual strategy is a function of resource availability. 4 
Because of basic asymmetries in economic and political resources, small firms and workers 
are less able than large firms to pursue individual strategies. Individual strategies are 
generally less available for the owners of small firms, who tend not to have privileged access 
to state officials and whose individual investment decisions have less of an effect on the 
economy as a whole. The individual weakness of the small firm, subsequently, increases the 
importance of collective representation through formal business organisations.5 
The increased importance of organisation for small firms is compounded by a more 
cumbersome set of impediments to collective action, and on this axis small firms are 
distinguishable not just from large firms but also from workers. Capitalists, generally, 
overcome barriers to collective action in two reinforcing ways, each of which tends to leave 
the ensuing associations in the hands of big firms. First, larger firms bear the costs of 
organisation-building. Second, capitalists overcome impediments to organisation by 
fragmenting according to productive activity, or ‘sector’.6 While encompassing, economy-
wide organisations do exist in most countries, the more common form of business 
organisation is the sector-specific trade association. Fragmentation facilitates collective action 
by creating smaller collectivities with more homogenous interests, effectively parcelling 
business into a multitude of “privileged groups”.7 For example, fragmentation helps chemical 
producers organise, not only by creating a smaller collectivity, but also by eliminating the 
interests of other producers with whom they might enter into conflict on issues of public 
policy. And, of course, fragmentation into sectors also preserves the key condition of 
asymmetrical resource distribution, which allows large firms to bear the costs of organisation-
building within these sectors. 
The strategy of forming organisations via sectoral fragmentation has limited utility for 
overcoming the challenges of small firm representation. Fragmentation can help capitalists 
overcome the obstacles to collective action derived from horizontal, inter-sectoral conflicts, 
but it leaves vertical, intra-sectoral conflicts to be reconciled internally. Though some small 
firms will join and participate in associations created via sectoral fragmentation, these 
                                                 
4 Traxler, 1993. 
5 Haydu makes a similar point in suggesting that there is greater variability in capitalist collective action then 
proposed by Offe and Wiesenthal. In Offe and Wiesenthal’s framework, the power of individual capitalist firms 
vitiates the importance of formal organization. Haydu, however, argues that such reasoning makes sense for 
modern corporations but not with regard to proprietary capitalists of 19th century. Thus, for Haydu the crucial 
variable that affects the importance of organisation is the historical period, which ultimately becomes a proxy for 
firm size (Haydu, 1999; Offe & Wiesenthal, 1980). See also, Lester M. Salamon & John J. Siegfried, ‘Economic 
Power and Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy’, American Political Science 
Review, 71:3 (September 1977), pp. 1026-1043. 
6 Streeck (1990); Traxler (1993). 
7 Olson (1965), p.143. 
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organisations tend to represent the interests of the larger firms that supply the resources for 
their creation and continued existence. Furthermore, while fragmentation helps capitalists 
organise by producing smaller, more homogenous groups that continue to benefit from an 
asymmetrical distribution of resources, it is a considerably less effective strategy for small 
industrialists: fragmentation by size into a collectivity of small firms has the perverse effect of 
removing the larger enterprises that are potential organisation-builders. Left to their own 
devices, then, organisation is particularly difficult for small business, as the number and 
spatial dispersion of small firms complicate coordination and increase the likelihood of free-
riding.  
Indeed, small firms face more intense obstacles to collective action, not just relative to big 
business, but, in many dimensions, also relative to workers. Unlike a collectivity of factory 
workers that are concentrated on the shop floor, for example, individual small firms are more 
isolated from each other, which increases the difficulties of monitoring participation and 
sanctioning free riders.8 The particular challenges to small firm collective action are also 
heightened by the perverse effects of anticipated upward mobility. Workers in larger unions 
with ample resources retain an interest in increasing worker organisation and broadening the 
labour movement. Among the broad category of ‘small firms’, medium-sized firms (e.g. in 
this study firms with 101-250 employees) may also have sufficient resources to be potential 
organisation-builders. Yet such firms may be less likely to play the part. This difference can 
be attributed to the fact that business firms are organisations themselves that can grow in size. 
Aspirations of upward mobility – of the small firm becoming a big firm – mean the owners of 
such firms may perceive fewer costs in joining existing organisations dominated by larger 
firms, and less to be gained by promoting organisational cohesion within the small firm 
sector. Potential organisation-builders have less incentive to invest resources in establishing 
separate organisations to represent the distinct interests of small firms. In effect, the promise 
(or hope) of developing from being a small firm to becoming a big firm can act as a fetter on 
collective action.  
 
The State, Corporatism, and the Opportunities (or Challenges?) of Pluralism 
Though small industrialists’ core characteristics predispose them towards disorganisation and 
weakness, it would be a mistake to conclude that they will necessarily remain politically 
unimportant. There are multiple solutions to the collective action problem, 9 and many groups 
that face difficult obstacles to collective action become organized with the direct or indirect 
assistance of the state. Indeed, the provision of selective incentives that facilitate collective 
action is a fundamental way that states shape patterns of organisation and mobilisation.10  
One set of institutions of particular importance are ‘corporatist’ frameworks that structure 
patterns of interest association. Schmitter defines corporatism as a “system of interest and/or 
                                                 
8 Michael D. Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994, p.40; see also Haydu (1999), p.508. Of course, the flipside to this is that the external 
opposition to organisation among firms is significantly less than the external opposition to organisation among 
workers. That is, for small firms, unlike workers, collective action rarely if ever takes place in the context (and 
under the shadow) of other actors that seek to discourage and undermine the process. 
9 Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma , Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 
10The incentives may be embedded in laws and constitutions themselves, and they may be provided by means of 
the direct actions of politicians and state officials. See Robert H. Bates, ‘Macropolitical Economy in the Field of 
Development’, in James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle (eds), Perspectives on Positive Political Economy, New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1990; Ben Ross Schneider, Business Politics in 20th Century Latin America, 
forthcoming 2004. 
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attitude representation... for linking the associationally organized interests of civil society with 
the decisional structures of the state”. 11 Key elements of corporatism include regulations that 
make membership compulsory to certain organisations and policymaking regimes that give 
special status to ‘official’, state-licensed associations.12 
 An important implication of distinguishing between big and small firms’ collective 
action challenges is that small industrialists may have a different orientation towards 
corporatist regulations that affect interest organisation. Because big firms generally rely less 
on state concessions to organise, and because they can often escape state- imposed constraints 
on organisation, it is generally argued that the state’s capacity to structure patterns of 
capitalist interest association is weak.13 Not surprisingly, attempts to impose corporatist 
restraints on big business tend to be relatively ineffective. For small industry, in contrast, the 
comparatively greater importance of formal organisation combined with a comparatively 
lesser ability to overcome the impediments to collective action suggest that patterns of 
association are likely to be more sensitive to state institutions.  
 A staple of the literature on corporatism is that such regulatory frameworks can distort 
representation. Concessions such as licensing and compulsory membership can serve as 
invaluable ingredients for overcoming barriers to collective action. But because concessions 
extended under one set of political conditions can be withdrawn under other conditions, 
however, dependence on organisational concessions can generate vulnerability.14 
Vulnerability to the removal of such concessions, in turn, can make an organisation’s 
leadership less accountable to the membership and more oriented towards satisfying the state. 
Indeed, reorienting the accountability of an organisation’s leadership from the membership to 
the state is frequently one of the objectives in extend ing concessions.  
While corporatism certainly entails constraints on certain types of political activities, it is 
important to understand how corporatist regulations can also provide opportunities. To be 
sure, where regulations on association are imposed from above, what Schmitter labeled “state 
corporatism”, groups risk losing their autonomy to the state.15 But one has to be careful, 
analytically, not to prioritise autonomy over organisation. The risk of losing organisational 
autonomy is predicated on the prior existence of organisational cohesion. If a social group 
that depends on organisation for representation is fragmented and unorganised, reduced 
autonomy is hardly the biggest problem it faces. On the contrary, if a sacrifice of autonomy is 
the price to be paid for overcoming obstacles to collective action, many weak groups may be 
                                                 
11 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?” The Review of Politics, 36:1, (January 1974), p.86. 
12 Collier provides an insightful discussion of how the concept of corporatism has been used in the study of Latin 
American politics (David Collier, ‘Trajectory of a Concept: “Corporatism” in the Study of Latin American Politics’, 
in Peter H. Smith (ed.), Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New Approaches to Method and Analysis, 
Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). 
13 Mick Moore & Ladi Hamalai, ‘Economic Liberalization, Political Pluralism and Business Associations in 
Developing Countries’, World Development, 21:12 (December 1993), pp.1895-1912; Guillermo A. O’Donnell, 
‘Corporatism and the Question of the State’, in James M. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin 
America, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977; Offe and Wiesenthal (1980). 
14 David Collier & Ruth B. Collier, ‘Who Does What, to Whom, and How: Toward a Comparative Analysis of Latin 
American Corporatism’, in James M. Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America, Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977. 
15 Schmitter (1974). Indeed, that was often the objective of state officials. Controls were typically imposed on 
already mobilized and organized groups (see James M. Malloy(ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin 
America, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977; Guillermo A. O’Donnell, Modernization and 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 
University of California, 1973). 
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willing – if not eager – to pay this price. Weak actors may take advantage of the opportunities 
presented by corporatist institutions to build alliances with the state.16  
Rather than regarding the ensuing relationship as entirely state-inspired and state-dominated, 
we should conceive of corporatism – even state corporatism – as establishing a bargaining 
framework that includes trade-offs. Social groups acting within a corporatist framework 
balance the benefits gained from state concessions, e.g. increased organisational cohesion, 
with the costs entailed by dependence on the state, e.g. decreased organisational autonomy. 
We cannot know a priori how actors will weigh these trade-offs, but it is essential to 
recognize that the political relationships that develop within such frameworks may not simply 
be imposed by the state but are part of a strategy of the weak actors that prioritise 
organisational cohesion over autonomy. 
The complex trade-offs between organisational cohesion and organisational autonomy are 
likely to produce tensions within associations that attempt to represent small firms. 
Representative organisations must respond to the demands of the membership, of course, and 
they also need to devise strategies to preserve resources and the capacity to participate in 
policymaking. The tensions between these two tasks, always present for organisations, are 
intensified for organisations representing small firms.17 This distinction derives from the 
previous discussion. The heightened importance of formal organisation means that sectoral 
leaders must be acutely concerned about preserving the capacity to represent – to retain the 
association’s seat at the table. Concern with preserving the representative status and capacity 
of the organisation may motivate partial suppression of members’ immediate interests on a 
given issue of public policy. From the organisation’s perspective, it may seem imprudent to 
exhaust resources in defeat today, particularly if doing so threatens to jeopardize the capacity 
to project members’ interests tomorrow, against a different and potentially weaker array of 
opposing forces.  
The benefits obtained by this sort of representative strategy, however, can become 
outweighed by the costs. Most importantly, as the benefits accruing to an association’s 
membership decline, where the membership (or important parts of the membership) perceive 
that the organisation’s input is not generating adequate benefits or that the benefits extracted 
by accommodation appear narrowly distributed, a representative strategy that subordinates 
members’ interests to organisational preservation is likely to generate backlash. Again, these 
standard dilemmas, generic to business organisations, are accentuated in the case of small 
industry because of the sector’s debilitating core attributes. 
Democratisation may amplify these divisions over representative strategy by making the 
opportunity costs of prioritising organisational preservation appear greater. Democratisation 
presents social actors with opportunities for new forms of social protest, new avenues of 
interest articulation, and potentially new alliance partners. Political party competition, the 
emergence of more active legislatures, and the  appearance (or reappearance) of civil society 
and new arenas of contestation can make the previous set of trade-offs seem stale. The 
availability of new alliance partners, for example, can make it appear that organisational 
cohesion may be obtainable without sacrificing autonomy to the state. For those actors 
                                                 
16 Foster makes a similar argument with regard to associations under authoritarian rule in China (Kenneth W. 
Foster, ‘Associations in the Embrace of an Authoritarian State: State Domination of Society?’ Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 35:4 (Winter 2001), pp. 84-109). 
17 See, for example, Philippe C. Schmitter & Wolfgang Streeck, ‘The Organization of Business Interests: A 
Research Design to Study the Associative Action of Business in the Advanced Industrial Societies of Western 
Europe’, Discussion Paper IIM/LPM 81-13. Berlin: Wissenschaftszentrum, 1981). 
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embittered by sacrificed autonomy, then, democratisation can make alternative strategies 
appear more feasible and desirable. These different evaluations of opportunity costs, in turn, 
can aggravate tensions between rival groups within a given organisation. 
Democratisation may also introduce episodes of institutional contestation and transformation, 
which in turn may exacerbate the difficulties of small business representation. In general, 
because powerful actors can benefit more from ad hoc and less routinised forms of 
representation, they may have less interest in increasing broader societal access to the state. To 
the extent that democratisation threatens to reduce big business’ access relative to other social 
groups, we may witness attempts to take advantage of the opportunities presented by 
democratisation to construct new and more exclusionary mechanisms for interest articulation. 18  
But big firms are not the only actors who may be threatened by democratisation. Episodes of 
institutional contestation and transformation can have perverse effects on small firm 
representation. Take the issue of corporatism, for example. Though democratisation does not 
require the elimination of corporatism, it subjects such regulations to contestation. We might 
expect actors constrained by corporatist regulations to take advantage of democratisation. 
After all, democratisation opens new possibilities for interest articulation, free of the 
constraints inherent to operating under corporatist regulations. Yet for actors that have 
benefited from a given policymaking regime – even ‘weak’ actors – democratisation may be 
regarded not as an opportunity so much as a threat. Sunk costs and the “practical temptations” 
of operating under one set of political arrangements may make new and more pluralistic 
arrangements appear less attractive.19 Thus, to the extent that democratisation contributes to 
contestation over the institutions that undergird familiar patterns of state-societal interaction, 
some actors who secured beneficial positions under authoritarian governments may resist and 
even oppose democratisation. 20 In fact, some actors may exhaust limited resources attempting 
to preserve existing institutional arrangements. 
 Though securing representation in authoritarian and corporatist settings presents small 
firms with the challenge of dealing with dependence on the state, the removal of concessions 
delivered through corporatist frameworks presents the challenge of how to remain organized 
and how to retain access to the state. First-order difficulties of collective action and 
organisational cohesion, the same concerns that can make corporatism appear as an 
opportunity, can be revealed and returned to prominence under conditions of voluntary 
membership. In other words, not all groups constrained by corporatism are likely to be 
strengthened by democracy. Potential new opportunities emerge, as impediments to 
                                                 
18 In fact, this same logic is precisely what underlies scepticism of the effect of financial integration and the 
increased prominence of mobile asset holders might have on strengthening democratic institutions (James 
Mahon, Mobile Capital and Latin American Development, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996, Chapter 5). For an overview of various hypotheses regarding mobile asset holders and democracy, see 
Leslie Elliot Armijo, ‘Mixed Blessing: Expectations about Foreign Capital Flows and Democracy in Emerging 
Markets’, in Leslie Elliot Armijo (ed.), Financial Globalization and Democracy in Emerging Markets, London: 
Palgrave, 1999.  
19 Philippe C. Schmitter, ‘The Consolidation of Democracy and Representation of Social Groups’, American 
Behavioral Scientist, 35:4-5 (March-June 1992), p.437; Timothy J. Power and Mahrukh Doctor, ‘Beyond the 
Century of Corporatism? Continuity and Change in Brazil’, in Howard J. Wiarda (ed.), Authoritarianism and 
Corporatism in Latin America, Revisited, Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, forthcoming 2004. 
20More generally, see Kevin J. Middlebrook, The Paradox of Revolution: Labor, the State, and Authoritarianism in 
Mexico, Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, who uses this insight to call into 
question Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens’s expectation of organized labour as protagonist of 
democratisation (Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist 
Development and Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
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organisation are reduced, but democratisation can replace organisational dependence and 
diminished autonomy – the pathologies of corporatism – with organisational instability, 
decay, and political irrelevance. 
 We now move from the abstract to the concrete, applying this framework to analysis 
of small industry representation in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil.  
 
II. Mexico: Democratisation and Declining Representation  
Small firms’ core characteristics make securing representation an uphill struggle in any 
political system, but in post-war Mexico, the nature of the regime provided fertile territory for 
small industrialists to secure reliable representation. While authoritarianism and corporatist 
regulations on interest association were constraining, these conditions also presented small 
firms with a window of opportunity to develop and nurture an alliance with the state. That is, 
corporatism provided opportunities for overcoming collective action problems, and incentives 
to develop mechanisms for organisational development. Small firms lacked autonomy, but 
they had representation. In contrast, democratisation and the withdrawal of the state revealed 
the sector’s weaknesses and did not provide fertile terrain for sustaining organisational 
capacities and coherence. Subsequently, dependency was replaced by fragmentation and 
weakness.  
 
Dependence, Accommodation, and Representation  
The cornerstone of the corporatist framework that regulated business organisations in Mexico 
was the Chambers Law (Ley de Cámaras) of 1936, revised in 1941. The 1936 law required all 
Mexican firms to join state-sanctioned chambers of commerce and industry, which, in turn, 
were obligated to join the national Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
(CONCANACOMIN).21 This confederation was formed by combining the Confederation of 
Chambers of Commerce (CONCANACO) and the Confederation of Chambers of Industry 
(CONCAMIN), founded in 1917 and 1918, respectively. The Law defined the chambers and 
the confederation as “public autonomous institutions”, designated them as the private sector’s 
official representative bodies, and provided the state with various mechanisms of control over 
the formation and functioning of both sorts of official organisations.  
 The key innovation of the 1941 Chambers Law was to make a statutory distinction 
between industry and commerce. From this point forward industrialists would join 
specifically industrial chambers, which would be members of the reconstituted CONCAMIN, 
while retailers and service-providers would join chambers of commerce, affiliated to 
CONCANACO. In industrial sectors where chambers did not already exist, industrialists were to 
request permission from the state to form new chambers.  
 At the same time, the state sponsored the creation of a new organisation, the National 
Chamber of Manufacturing Industry (CANACINTRA). In the subsequent decades this 
organisation would serve as the principal representative of small industry in Mexico. 
                                                 
21 This  requirement did not apply to financial services. Banks, insurance companies, and later stock brokerages 
each formed their own organisations that were not regulated by the Chambers Law. This paper analyses the 
organisation of small industry within the corporatist framework. See Ben Ross Schneider, ‘Why is Mexican 
Business So Organized?’ Latin American Research Review, 37:1 (2002), pp. 77-118, for discussion of 
independent business organisations that operated outside of the corporatist framework. 
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 When CANACINTRA was created in 1941, it was designated as a mixed-activity, catch-
all chamber for new and emerging manufacturing sectors that did not have their own chambers; 
it was not designated as a chamber for small industrialists per se. It was the pattern of interest 
organisation that followed the 1941 Chambers Law that transformed CANACINTRA into the de 
facto representative of small, domestic-oriented, Mexican industrialists.  
 The organisation underwent rapid growth throughout the post-war era, as thousands of 
industrialists in unorganised sectors became legally obligated to join and pay dues to the 
chamber. At the same time that it was growing, however, CANACINTRA also lost members to 
new industrial chambers that were affiliated directly to the Confederation of Industrial Chambers 
(CONCAMIN). 
 This pattern of fragmentation – from CANACINTRA and into sector-specific chambers 
– was most pronounced in those sectors dominated by larger firms. One reason for this tendency 
is that larger firms have a relatively easier time overcoming the barriers to collective action that 
might otherwise impede the formation of organisations. Larger firms were also better prepared to 
satisfy the legal requirements for establishing new chambers, and they were more likely to have 
adequate contacts and resources to sway the appropriate state officials responsible for 
authorizing the creation of new chambers. Moreover, as CANACINTRA came to represent small 
firms, larger firms with distinct interests and with needs for distinct services wanted their own 
organisations. These factors reinforced each other: big firms leaving CANACINTRA turned the 
chamber into the representative of small firms, and CANACINTRA’s vocation as the 
representative of small firms heightened big firms’ desire to leave. 
The creation of new chambers in CONCAMIN increased the dependence of CANACINTRA on 
the state, for the process of fragmentation made it more difficult to keep the organisation 
together. Capitalists, in general, are less stymied by typical impediments to collective action, 
because an asymmetrical distribution of resources within the collectivity increases the 
likelihood that there will be larger firms able to bear the burdens of organisation-building.22 In 
the case of CANACINTRA, however, at the same time as the chamber’s membership was 
growing, it was losing the large firms that might have simplified and facilitated organisation. 
Many of the remaining members tended to be smaller and less stable, increasing the 
chamber’s dependence on compulsory membership for organisational cohesion.  
The creation of new chambers also eroded CANACINTRA’s membership base and resources. 
Even though the creation of new chambers was led by large firms, it occurred within a legal 
framework that required sectoral chambers to be comprehensive. Because the Chambers Law 
made membership to the new chamber compulsory for all firms in the sector – not just the 
handful of big firms that petitioned for the new chamber – the establishment of a new 
chamber therefore meant that hundreds of dues-paying members of all sizes would leave 
CANACINTRA. 
Although the Chambers Law made state authorization a prerequisite for the creation of new 
chambers, the vagueness of the Law left state officials with a substantial degree of discretion. 
According to the Chambers Law, the government was to determine when a new chamber could 
be created and which firms should join which chambers. But the Law did not clearly specify the 
requisites for establishing separate industrial chambers; nor, critically, did it define the criteria 
by which officials determined whether a group of manufacturers should form their own 
chamber or remain members of CANACINTRA.  
                                                 
22 Van Waarden (1991). 
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Thus, in the decades following the 1941 Chambers Law, CANACINTRA came to depend on 
the state in a variety of important ways. The chamber depended on compulsory membership, 
for that is what guaranteed the organisation an expanding base of dues-paying members, 
members that otherwise might face daunting obstacles to collective action and suffer from 
free-riding. And CANACINTRA depended on favourable application of the Chambers Law, 
particularly with regard to rulings on the creation of new chambers, for that is what saved the 
chamber from undergoing a massive haemorrhaging of members and resources.  
The fact that the Chambers Law gave the state the tools to determine CANACINTRA’s fate 
encouraged the chamber’s leadership to make small industry an important ally of the state. 
CANACINTRA adopted a strategy of ‘accommodation’, which consisted of adopting a 
cautious and conciliatory approach towards state officials, avoiding outspoken criticism of 
post-war economic policy, and bypassing alliances outside of the state. By offering support of 
the government – even a government implementing economic policies that were frequently 
counter to the interests of small manufacturers – CANACINTRA exchanged political 
autonomy for organisational stability. 
Organisational stability allowed CANACINTRA to participate in national political economy 
and deliver valuable concessions to small industrialists. To be sure, small manufacturers were 
not the dominant actor in state-business relations; they did not drive policy. Yet 
CANACINTRA was able to cultivate ties to the state and to extract concessions for small 
firms in the areas of trade, foreign investment, and industrial finance. Small industrialists 
lacked power, but not representation: they had an advocate. Though CANACINTRA did not 
drive economic policy, official status provided the chamber leadership with a reliable set of 
contacts with state policymakers. The downside to this, however, was that the price of access for 
a weak actor like small industry was the sacrifice of autonomy, and this remained a contentious 
issue among the membership throughout the post-war period. 
 
From Dependence to Irrelevance 
The 1980s featured economic crisis, the transition to a neoliberal model of economic 
development, and democratisation. This section focuses on the latter of these changes, 
demonstrating how democratisation led to a decline in small industry representation. The 
particular aspect of democratisation considered here is the relaxation of corporatist constraints 
on business association. 23  
Compulsory membership to chambers was terminated in January 1997, though a ruling by the 
Mexican Supreme Court had made that aspect of the Chambers Law effectively unenforceable 
since earlier in the decade.24 Because individual plaintiffs could obtain injunctions without 
going through long court battles, firms stopped paying membership dues and the state stopped 
sanctioning violators.  
The demise of compulsory membership, in the context of broader economic and political 
changes, provoked a revaluation of CANACINTRA’s relationship with its members. The 
chamber’s strategy to recruit and retain members had traditionally been oriented more 
towards the state than towards the firms that comprised the membership. The reasons for this 
orientation derived from the nature of the post-World War II developmentalist policymaking 
                                                 
23 I consider electoral competition and the role of political parties in Shadlen (2004), Chapter 5. 
24 Carlos Arriola, ‘La ley de cámaras empresariales y sus confederaciones ’, Foro Internacional, 37:2 (October-
December 1997), pp. 634-660. 
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regime and the corporatist institutions. Since CANACINTRA had access to the state agencies 
that made decisions on import licenses, for example, small firms lacking individual clout 
depended on the chamber to act as their agent. And because the Chambers Law made 
membership compulsory, the relationship between the chamber and its members was 
asymmetrical: small firms needed CANACINTRA more than the chamber depended on the 
membership. 
Each of these conditions underwent significant change in the 1990s. The neoliberal model 
implied a fundamental transformation of corporatism. The replacement of licenses with 
tariffs, for example, clearly deprived CANACINTRA of an important concession that it had 
been able to deliver to members. Also, the new pattern of state-business consultation that 
emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s, featuring close collaboration between policymakers and 
peak organisations controlled by Mexico’s largest firms, meant that CANACINTRA had less 
access to the state and was less able to deliver a service of providing voice. Finally, the end of 
compulsory membership meant that CANACINTRA would have to attract members on a 
voluntary basis. By the mid-1990s, then, the economic model and the transformation of 
corporatism made it more difficult for CANACINTRA to attract small firms while at the same 
time making it imperative to do so. 
CANACINTRA’s leaders attempted to reform the chamber. A confidential “Immediate 
Action Programme”, prepared at the highest levels of the organisation, served as a guiding 
document for organisational reform in the mid-1990s.25 The cornerstone of CANACINTRA’s 
reform programme entailed the provision of more services, and particularly services for which 
the chamber could charge fees.26 By providing a wider array of services to small firms 
CANACINTRA hoped to make membership so desirable that firms would choose to join on a 
voluntary basis. And by charging for such services, the chamber aimed to generate an 
additional source of revenue. Diversified revenues might make the organisation less 
dependent on the state, for the simple reason that the existence of alternative sources of 
revenue reduce vulnerability to the removal of state support. 
At the same time that the end of compulsory membership made the need to find new revenue 
sources more essential than ever, however, the chamber found itself less capable of 
responding to the challenge. The deep economic crisis that followed the 1994 devaluation of 
the peso led to widespread small firm bankruptcies. Many of CANACINTRA’s members 
ceased to exist, and many of those that did not close their doors conserved scarce resources by 
suspending their chamber membership. In addition, CANACINTRA’s tepid response to the 
rapidly changing economic environment during the late 1980s and early 1990s had led to 
widespread discontent on the part of the membership;27 and the economic crisis only 
aggravated the damage already done to the chamber’s legitimacy among small manufacturers. 
The combined result of the crisis and the continuing loss of stature was that fewer firms 
voluntarily paid their membership dues. 
When compulsory membership was officially terminated in 1997, CANACINTRA’s 
membership plummeted. Rather than gain or even retain members, the chamber underwent 
massive haemorrhaging. After decades of continued membership growth, the chamber entered 
into a rapid and precipitous tailspin. From nearly 90,000 firms in the late-1980s, 
                                                 
25 CANACINTRA, Programa de Acción Inmediata . Confidential internal document, 1994. 
26 The chamber also sought to gain additional revenue by selling more advertising in CANACINTRA 
publications and by renting excess office space. 
27 Kenneth C. Shadlen ‘Neoliberalism, Corporatism, and Small Business Political Activism in Contemporary 
Mexico’, Latin American Research Review, 35:2 (Spring 2000), pp. 73-106. 
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CANACINTRA’s membership shrunk to approximately 15,000 by 1997. Although 
membership rebounded in 1999-2000 in the context of economic recovery, it remained at a 
lower level than in the 1960s. The decline is particularly sharp when membership is measured 
as a percent of all manufacturing firms. Whereas CANACINTRA’s membership accounted 
for ten to fifteen percent of all manufacturing firms in the mid-1950s and, following the 1960 
reform of the Chambers Law, rose to nearly sixty percent of all firms by the 1980s, by the end 
of the 1990s fewer than five percent of all manufacturing firms belonged to the chamber, the 
lowest share since the 1940s. 
The loss of so many dues-paying members left CANACINTRA in serious financial 
difficulties, precisely the sort of revenue crisis that the leadership had sought to avert with the 
Immediate Action Programme. The financial crisis was worsened by the fact that the strategy 
to invest in services had not just failed to create new sources of revenue, but backfired. Many 
of the projects entailed large investments, and to finance these investments the chamber had 
borrowed significantly. Yet the recession reduced the demand for the services. Thus, in the 
wake of the 1995 crisis, investment in services turned out to be quite costly: participation 
diminished at the same time as the chamber’s debt-servicing obligations ballooned. In fact, 
CANACINTRA had taken out large loans against its Mexico City office building, and in the 
wake of the crisis the chamber, like many businesses and families, risked losing its ‘home’ to 
its creditors.28 To stave off its creditors, CANACINTRA downsized. It cut back on the 
services it provided, it reduced its staff and payroll, and moved into a smaller part of its 
building to make office space available on a rental basis.  
Ultimately, CANACINTRA failed to make the transition from being a business association 
that could flourish under authoritarianism and developmentalism to an association capable of 
thriving in a democratic and pluralist context. The chamber’s efforts to reconstruct its 
relationship with the membership were unsuccessful, as indicated by the continued loss of 
members and the considerable worsening of its finances. The financial crunch created a 
vicious circle: the chamber lacked members and resources, and without a membership base it 
lacks resources to invest in services that could increase membership in a time of voluntary 
affiliation. 
Importantly, the chamber’s principal problem by the late 1990s was no longer that 
dependence on the state and concern with organisational preservation led to the subordination 
of members’ members’ concerns – the problems associated with corporatism. Rather, with the 
removal of compulsory membership the problem was that CANACINTRA, quite simply, 
became irrelevant. It would not disappear, but it was left lingering in a state of decay with 
diminished representative capacity and minimal access to the state. 
CANACINTRA’s declining role in Mexican politics meant that a bigger share of the burden 
for representing small industry fell on the shoulders of CONCAMIN, of which 
CANACINTRA remained a member.29 While CONCAMIN was historically dominated by 
large Mexican and transnational manufacturing firms, it took a greater interest in small 
industry in the 1990s. Yet CONCAMIN was also marginalized by the new pattern of state-
business consultation, which gave a prominent role to peak organisations such as the peak 
                                                 
28 Lucía Rangel Flores & Roberto Fuentes Vivar, ‘¿Son mejores que los políticos?’ Expansión, 770 (21 July 
1999). 
29CONCAMIN also suffered from the loss of compulsory membership, but it was better able to withstand the 
storm because it had always depended to a greater degree on the non-compulsory contributions of voluntary 
associations. 
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Business Coordinating Council, CCE. 30 Thus, even as CONCAMIN became more responsive 
to the concerns of small industry, it had scarcely more capacity than CANACINTRA to 
represent this segment of capital. 
Of course, virtually all business organisations, including those dominated by big business like 
the CCE, claim to represent small firms. The question, however, is not whether peak 
organisations call for helping small firms, which they invariably do, but the extent to which 
they will defend the interests of small industry when these interests enter into conflict with the 
interests of larger firms.  
The fundamental issue of how the CCE reconciles conflicting interests is evident in the 
organisation’s approach to industrial policy. Industrial integration may be driven by the 
autonomous investment decisions of leading firms, but post-war history has also demonstrated 
the important role the state can play in encouraging linkage between large and small firms.31 
Some regulations will be resisted by larger firms that would prefer lower-cost or higher 
quality sources of supply that may be available in foreign markets. The real crux of 
representation, then, comes down to the capacity and willingness of an orga nisation to fight 
for promotional policies that specifically help small firms even if doing so places constraints 
on bigger firms. Such was the role that CANACINTRA played for decades, but neither the 
chamber nor CONCAMIN are able to fight these battles in the new political-economic 
environment. Peak organisations dominated by Mexico’s largest firms serve as an unreliable 
substitute. 
Furthermore, even when interests of small and large firms are entirely compatible – when the 
challenge is not conflict reconc iliation but rather interest coordination – peak organisations 
dominated by large firms provide unreliable representation. As discussed above, the concerns 
of smaller firms tend to be different from the concerns of larger firms. To be sure, large firms 
may not be threatened by the sorts of demands made by small firms. Large firms would stand 
to benefit by having small firms with better access to credit and technology, for example, and 
thus more productive and better equipped to integrate into broader chains of production. But 
lobbying has costs; and for organisations controlled and dominated by large firms, the costs of 
lobbying on behalf of small firms has to be weighed against the costs of operating without a 
dynamic small firm sector. Individual firms may look out for their own suppliers and clients, 
but at an organisational level these incentives are less salient. The result is that Mexico’s peak 
organisations consistently express support for small firms, but promotion of such firms 
remains a low priority, and thus the interests of smaller firms remain subordinated in 
Mexico’s new network of business associations. 
In response to CANACINTRA’s decay and the subordination of small firms’ interests within 
Mexico’s peak organisations, a number of associations have emerged to fill the gap. One such 
group is the National Association of Manufacturing Industrialists, which emerged in the 
1980s as a rival to CANACINTRA. 32 ANIT’s principal problems throughout the late 1980s 
and early 1990s were lack of access to state officials and to key state concessions available 
under the corporatist framework. As a result, the peripheral association was unable to sustain 
its challenge to CANACINTRA and remained marginalized from policymaking. But ANIT’s 
                                                 
30 Strom C. Thacker, Big Business, the State, and Free Trade: Constructing Coalitions in Mexico, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000; Shadlen (2004), Chapter 4. 
31 Alice H. Amsden, The Rise of “The Rest”: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government in East Asian Industrialization, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
32 Shadlen (2004), Chapter 3. 
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fortunes did not change with the demise of corporatism. On the contrary, ANIT suffers from 
even more intense collective action problems than CANACINTRA, as it lacks the 
institutional foundation of the latter organisation.  
To compensate for this weakness and isolation on the national front, in the late 1990s ANIT 
joined forces with similarly frustrated and dissenting small businesses groups throughout 
Latin America. ANIT led Mexico’s delegation to the initial meeting of the Latin American 
Business Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. The 1997 meeting, convened by CIVES, an activist 
group of industrialists based in São Paulo, was also attended by Argentina’s Assembly of 
Small and Medium Businessmen (APYME). The 1997 meeting was followed by an October 
1998 meeting convoked by ANIT in Mexico City, and another in Managua, Nicaragua, in 
February 2000. 
The product of this transnational collaboration, the Latin American Association of Micro, 
Small, and Medium Businessmen (ALAMPYME), amounts to a coordinated attack on what is 
regarded as a process of economic integration that victimizes small firms throughout the 
region. The declarations of each meeting emphasize the dire effects of “market 
fundamentalism” and advocate replacing the dominant neoliberal model with one that 
prioritises poverty reduction, a “just” distribution of income, and economic development 
based on stimulation of the domestic market. Not surprisingly, ALAMPYME’s calls for 
economic reactivation are based upon industrial integration and extensive support of small 
industry. 
The transnational route to interest articulation is more interesting for the size-based 
grievances it reflects than for representative capacity per se. To be sure, ALAMPYME 
provides small firms a voice in periodic and sporadic moments of transnational mobilization 
against the course of economic policy in Latin America. Yet there is little on-going 
communication between the three organisations, particularly between the two South 
American members and ANIT. Each member acts in the name of the alliance, but typically 
without consulting the other delegates.  Though the members convene international meetings 
and issue statements of solidarity, the real work remains to be done at home. In the case of 
ANIT, acting in the name of ALAMPYME gives it a fresh ring, but there is very little ‘Latin 
America’ in ALAMPYME in Mexico. It is another name for the same confederation of 
dissident Mexican small business associations, led by ANIT, that have attempted to establish 
new representative channels since the 1980s. Representation, ultimately, remains a national 
affair. And as a national affair, whether it is ANIT or ALAMPYME, these associations 
continue to operate with very little access to policymakers and other channels of authority. 
They have not been able to compensate for the decay of the network of official business 
organisations. 
 To summarize, Mexican small industry’s representation declined throughout the 
period of democratisation. Whereas corporatism presented small firms with the challenge of 
dealing with the consequences of dependence on the state, the elimination of compulsory 
membership brought into stark relief the difficulties of establishing organisational cohesion 
among small firms. CANACINTRA lost the capacity to act as small firms’ agent, and no 
other representative filled the vacated space. Fragmented, and lacking an authoritative 
organisation with a national presence, small industrialists lost regularized access to the state. 
To be sure, this period did witness the massive proliferation of new associations representing 
diverse segments of business. One 1999 estimate put the number of associations claiming to 
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represent small firms in one manner or another at approximately 300.33 The issue is not the 
number of associations, however, but the capacity of these associations to represent. The new 
organisations that emerged tend to be unstable. They suffer from even more intense resource 
limitations than CANACINTRA, and they tend to rely on the dedication and commitment of a 
few committed leaders. And while the new associations may have more autonomy than 
CANACINTRA ever did, they have minimal access to state officials and play extraordinarily 
marginal roles in national politics. If the only thing worse than being exploited is not being 
exploited, to paraphrase Joan Robinson, the case of small industry in Mexico suggests that the 
only thing worse than being dependent is to be irrelevant. 
 
 
III. Argentina: Organisational Autonomy, Political Opportunism, but Little 
Representation 
The case of Argentina points to the importance of political institutions and the insufficiency 
of democracy alone to secure small firm representation. In the years after World War II, the 
Argentine state helped small industrialists organize, but soon thereafter withdrew (or more 
accurately was expelled) from the arena of business organisations, leaving an institutional 
vacuum. As a result, small industry would be organized independently of big business, as in 
Mexico, but the organisation would lack any of the opportunities for constructive interaction 
with the  state. In either authoritarian or democratic contexts, lacking reliable access to the 
state, organisations representing small industry in Argentina never developed the capacities of 
their counterparts in Mexico. Whereas small industry in Mexico gained representation at the 
price of autonomy, small industry in Argentina had autonomy but not representation. Indeed, 
the case of Argentina points to the most dangerous pitfalls of pluralism for weak actors. 
 
Corporatism, Anti-Corporatism, and Organisational (Under)development  
In 1953 President Juan Perón expanded corporatist legislation to the business sector, with a 
revised Law of Professional Associations (LAP).34 The new framework established a 
hierarchical structure of business organisations with compulsory membership. The LAP 
created a pyramid of four levels, with sector-specific chambers integrated into federations, 
which were integrated into national confederations of industry, commerce, and agriculture, all 
of which was topped by an economy-wide peak confederation. 
A critically important aspect of Perón’s corporatist project was that it was designed to 
strengthen a segment of capital that was politically supportive. Perón’s rule was marked by 
sharp conflict with Argentina’s largest firms, organized in the Argentine Industrial Union 
(UIA). In fact, Perón closed the UIA in 1946, and in 1953, under the auspices of the LAP, the 
UIA was legally disbanded.35 At the same time, Perón embraced a project led by smaller 
                                                 
33Diario de Yucatán, 21 May 2000. 
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firms, mainly from the interior of the country, which held a series of conventions with the 
desire of forming organisations that would increase their representation in national politics.36 
Under Perón’s tutelage, these various organisations merged to create the General Economic 
Confederation (CGE). Perón’s new corporatist framework raised the CGE, which was 
explicitly pro-Peronist, to the top of the official hierarchy, making this confederation 
controlled by the weaker segment of local capital the most important business organisation in 
the country. As a consequence, in the remaining years of Perón’s government, no other 
business group had as much access to policymakers as did the CGE. 37 With the LAP imposed 
as a means to consolidate the new and supportive organisation’s domination of business 
politics, to strengthen the weaker segment of capital at the UIA’s expense, big business’s 
antipathy towards Perón quickly translated into a rejection of corporatism as well. 
The events following the September 1955 military coup, in which Perón was deposed and 
sent into exile, had important and lasting effects on the trajectories of business organisations 
in Argentina. The military reversed Perón’s biases, repealing those aspects of the LAP that 
applied to business: the UIA’s legal standing was reinstated, and the CGE out lawed.38 Then, 
the return of civilian politics in 1958 precipitated a rebirth of the CGE, as President Arturo 
Frondizi relegalised the organisation. 39 Yet, importantly, other aspects of the LAP that existed 
briefly in the early 1950s remained suppressed. Neither the civilian regimes nor the military 
governments that ruled in postwar Argentina restored the corporatist framework created by 
Perón. Compulsory membership was eliminated, so firms could join whatever chambers or 
associations they desired; these organisations were free to affiliate (or not affiliate) with other 
organisations and confederations; and no institutional framework provided organisations with 
regularized access to the state. 
The ensuing pattern of business association left Argentina with rival business organisations 
representing distinct segments of business and distinct projects of economic development. In 
the same sectors of economic activity, large firms typically joined organisations linked to the 
UIA, and small firms typically joined organisations linked to the CGE. The most salient 
differences between the leadership of the two were not in terms of sector, but rather size of 
firms.40 The UIA became the voice of the larger industrial firms, both nationally-owned and 
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local subsidiaries of fo reign enterprises, while the CGE was the political front for the smaller, 
domestic-oriented firms that sought a model of industrialization based on expansion of the 
domestic market.  
Although the organisational profiles in Argentina were similar to those that developed in 
Mexico, with the CGE and UIA analogous to CANACINTRA and CONCAMIN, 
respectively, business organisations played a fundamentally different role in post-war 
Argentine political economy. As most analysts of this period have observed, Argentine 
business organisations were more political organs, part of broader movements, than 
representative agents. The UIA was linked to the Radical Civic Union (UCR) and to factions 
of the military, for example, while the CGE remained tightly tied to the Peronist movement; 
and these organisations’ importance rose and fell with the fortunes of their political allies. 
Understanding the distinctive and politicised trajectories of Argentine business organisations 
requires appreciation of the countries’ intense political instability and, importantly, the 
dismantling of corporatism. As fluid as the Mexican system was, with a proliferation of 
voluntary associations emerging along side the network of official chambers and 
confederations, business politics in Mexico appears highly institutionalised in comparison 
with Argentina, where organisations were unable to count on any systematic and consistent 
channels to interact with policymakers. Lacking reliable access to the state, Argentine 
business associations had little to offer potential members. In addition, they had few 
incentives to develop internal systems for interest aggregation and coordination – to develop 
the capacity necessary to function as representatives. Rather, in the institutional vacuum of 
post-war Argentina, organisations essentially became politicised clubs of like-minded 
entrepreneurs.41 
With regard to small industry, the post-war environment meant that the CGE lacked both the 
inducements and the constraints that provided CANACINTRA with incentives to develop the 
strategy of accommodation analysed in Chapter Two. In fact, the CGE’s representative 
strategy was nearly the mirror image of CANACINTRA’s. Whereas CANACINTRA 
bypassed alliance alternatives and remained rather cautious in publicly criticizing economic 
policies that encouraged giantism, for example, the CGE developed close relationship with 
organized labour and was extraordinarily outspoken in its condemnation of economic policy. 
Indeed, from the time it was relegalised until the time it was repressed again in 1976, the CGE 
regularly allied with the General Labor Confederation (CGT) and the Peronist opposition to 
mobilize resistance to post-war economic policy. To be sure, the CGE and CGT were not 
always allied throughout this period, but at key moments the labour movement and the 
Peronist opposition could count on small business support in the formation of what O’Donnell 
labelled a “defensive alliance”. 42 
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privilegio, Buenos Aires: Editorial Anteo, 1985. 
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In considering this period of Argentine politics, it is worth underscoring that the absence of 
corporatism meant that the state had a limited array of subtle instruments to induce business 
organisations to moderate their behaviour. The state could not threaten to remove a benefit, 
such as compulsory membership, to elicit cooperative and conciliatory behaviour, or make 
leaders of the CGE think twice about participating in the ‘defensive alliance’. The Argentine 
state had one primary mechanism to influence the CGE’s behaviour – outright repression of 
the organisation and its allies, which is ultimately what happened in 1976. 
While the absence of corporatism created a permissive environment in which the CGE could 
engage freely in multiclass alliances, the apparent autonomy was double-edged. The absence 
of an institutionalised framework for interaction and the organisation’s distance from the 
state, except in the brief period when Perón returned to power in 1973, meant that the CGE 
had few opportunities to advocate on behalf of members as CANACINTRA did.43 As a result, 
it had little incentive to devise reliable mechanisms to gather and reconcile members’ 
positions on key issues. Nor, it would appear, was the organisation compelled to formulate a 
strategy to project members’ interests discreetly and behind the scenes with government 
officials. Thus, despite the political prominence of the CGE in most accounts of post-war 
political economy, it would be very difficult to maintain that small industrialists in Argentina 
secured reliable representation. 
 
More Pluralism, More Organisation, Less Representation 
After a period of intensely repressive military rule, from 1976-1983, Argentina experienced a 
democratic transition that introduced a fresh terrain for business interest organisation. The 
new environment would be significantly less politicised and more pluralist then what was 
witnessed in the post-war decades. Business politics would no longer feature rival 
organisations forming part of rival political movements articulating distinct development 
projects, and, critically, organisations would be safe from government repression. No longer 
would associations have to worry about being outlawed, having their assets frozen, or even 
their leaders imprisoned, as they did throughout the post-war period.44 
 Yet Argentinean business organisations continued to lack an institutional framework 
that might nourish and encourage business organisation. Whereas in Mexico the state and 
leading sectors of business together created a new form of business-government interaction in 
the course of democratisation, this sort of institution and organisation building did not occur 
in Argentina.45 As a result, the institutional vacuum created by the dismantling of corporatism 
in the 1950s remained. Membership was still voluntary, and organisations could not count on 
routinised access to state officials. Government-business interaction was remarkably ad hoc, 
as officials consulted with small groups of leading firms depending on the issue at hand.46  
Democratisation and this more pluralist system of government-business interaction have not 
ushered in an increase in small industry representation. The CGE, repressed during the late 
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1970s, has been unable to rebound. Nor have new organisations that emerged gained the 
capacity to represent small firms. In Argentina, democratisation has led to more fragmentation 
rather than organisation and more representation. The following paragraphs look briefly at 
small industry representation in the final quarter of the 20th Century. 
The military regime that ruled Argentina from 1976-1983 crushed the CGE because of the 
organisation’s alliance with Peronism and the labour movement. All organisations belonging 
to the CGE were closed, and the Confederation itself was again outlawed. Economic policy 
created an equally inhospitable environment for small manufacturers, as a combination of 
tight credit, currency overvaluation, and trade liberalization initiated a long period of 
deindustrialisation. Indeed, some have argued that a principal goal of economic policymakers 
during the Proceso, as it is called, was to dismantle the social bases of the recurrent alliance 
between organized labour and small industry. 47 
The serious economic challenges for small industry continued in the decades after military 
rule. The 1980s was a period of protracted economic crisis, as the government of Raúl 
Alfonsín struggled to meet obligations on the large foreign debt accumulated by the military 
regime.48 Then, following the outbreak of hyperinflation at the end of the decade, the Peronist 
government of Carlos Menem introduced a period of deep structural change in the Argentine 
economy, using the Law of  Convertibility to fix the peso to the US dollar while at the same 
time undertaking deep and comprehensive privatisation and trade liberalization. 49 The 
economic instability and hyperinflation of the 1980s and the austerity and liberalisation of the 
1990s would have dramatic effects on small industry, as the country underwent a process of 
further deindustrialisation that featured significant weakening and disarticulation of 
productive chains.50 These economic conditions, added to the outright repression experienced 
under the 1976-83 military dictatorship, seriously undermined the CGE. 
Nor has the new political terrain of the post-1983 democracy constituted fertile ground for the 
CGE’s recovery. Democratisation allowed for the relegalisation of the CGE and its various 
affiliates, but the Confederation has been unable to recover either its membership base or 
public prominence. It has become a skeleton of what it once was, maintaining essentially 
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abandoned offices in Buenos Aires with a sparse administrative staff. The CGE, or more 
accurately the few dedicated leaders that keep it alive, persistently search for opportunities to 
work with the government and other business organisations and thus regain a public role, but 
such opportunities are few and far between. In addition to the difficult economic conditions 
that would make collective action difficult in any case, the CGE’s lack of access to the state 
seriously reduces firms’ incentives to join and participate.  
Ironically, the less politicised and more pluralist system of government-business interaction 
makes access to the state even more difficult for the CGE, which can no longer even count on 
its alliance with Peronism. In the 1990s, the remade Peronist party led by Menem had a 
fundamentally different base of social support than ‘traditional’ Peronism.51 Under Menem’s 
leadership, the Peronists had little interest in collaborating with and resuscitating this dying 
organisation. No longer could the CGE count on its external ally for help organizing smaller 
firms.  
Comparing Argentina and Mexico, it is evident that the vicious cycle discussed with reference 
to CANACINTRA – where declining membership generates fewer resources to invest in 
services, which in turn makes it more difficult to attract and retain members – is even more 
evident in the case of the CGE. The moribund CGE plays virtually no role in government-
business relations, but without either access to the state and or a stable membership base, it 
has been unable to reconstitute itself in democratic Argentina. Of course, CANACINTRA has 
also lost its external source of support: it can no longer count on compulsory membership or 
the political support of the ruling PRI. But at least the chamber has a legacy of organis ational 
cohesion that saves it from suffering quite the same fate as the CGE. 
It was largely in response to the demise of the CGE that a new organisation emerged to 
attempt to represent small firms in Argentina, the Assembly of Small and Medium Businesses 
(APYME). As indicated, the 1980s was a period of protracted economic adversity, marked by 
the debt crisis and repeated failure of programmes for macroeconomic stabilization and 
recovery, and where government-business consultation was dominated by a handful of 
Argentina’s largest firms.52 In this context, a group of small industrialists in and around 
Buenos Aires sought to build a new organisation specifically to defend the interests of small 
firms.  
In contrast to ANIT, APYME grew dramatically in the 1990s. It created a network of regional 
associations throughout the country and claims to have approximately 10,000 members.53  
Two important factors explain this distinct capacity for small business collective action in 
Argentina, distinct origins and external sponsorship. Whereas ANIT was born in competition 
with an existing organisation (CANACINTRA), APYME emerged explicitly to fill the gap 
left by the erosion of the CGE. Though these new associations in both Mexico and Argentina 
suffered from a lack of access, APYME, unlike ANIT, was never attacked by the state on 
behalf of a favoured rival: the Argentine state did not stunt APYME’s growth, as appears to 
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have happened in the case of ANIT. 54 Collective action, always difficult for small firms, is 
even more difficult in space that is already occupied. In Argentina, however, this was not as 
much of a problem as it was in Mexico. Second, APYME benefited from its leadership’s tight 
relationship with the Argentine Agrarian Federation (FAA) and the support of a bank based in 
Argentina’s long-standing movement of credit cooperatives. The FAA and Credicoop provide 
small firms in Argentina with financial and administrative support that ANIT traditionally has 
lacked, reducing the dependence of the association on the limited resources of its leaders. This 
sort of invaluable ‘external sponsorship’ has allowed small firms in Argentina to overcome 
the otherwise daunting challenges to collective action. 
Not only did APYME’s membership continue to grow, but so too did its level of activism. 
APYME was intensely critical of the Convertibility Plan and the Ménem government 
throughout the 1990s. And as economic conditions further deteriorated towards the end of the 
decade, APYME embarked on a strategy of building new alliances with a wide range of social 
groups that sought fundamental change in Argentina’s strategy of integration into the global 
economy. One prominent example of this activism is APYME’s participation in a series of 
events and protests organized by the Confederation of Argentine Workers (CTA), the branch 
of the labour movement that posed the most consistent and active opposition in the 1990s. 
Indeed, in late 2001 APYME joined the CTA and a wide range of Argentine social 
movements and civil society organisations to create the National Front to Fight Poverty 
(FRENAPO).  
In an important sense, however, APYME has been too successful in filling the space left by 
the CGE. APYME may express the legitimate grievances of many small firms, but it has even 
less of a role in policy making then the CGE did. Government officials pay virtually no 
attention to APYME, and the association is rarely consulted on matters that concern small 
firms. Indeed, the association’s bimonthly magazine is full of articles and photos 
commemorating participation in public events and promoting alternative strategies of 
development, but rarely does one come across discussions with legislators or officials in the 
Ministry of Economy. Nor is there much collaboration between APYME and other Argentine 
business organisations.  
APYME, ultimately, is a political movement that operates in a world of opposition 
movements, far removed from the day-to-day issues on which small firms need 
representation. APYME, like ANIT, has been successful in integrating small firms into 
broader networks of social protest, but without gaining access to policymaking. In neither 
case, however, has the movement-oriented strategy compensated for small industrialists’ 
weakness in the realm of business organisations. 
To the extent that any business organisation represents small industry in contemporary 
Argentina, it is the UIA. Historically the voice of Argentina’s largest and most 
internationalised firms, the UIA attempted to become more broadly representative in the 
aftermath of military rule. The newfound interest in small firms is in part a function of the 
intense economic difficulties faced by the industrial sector in the 1980s and 1990s. What 
many industrialists perceived as hostility towards the manufacturing sector in general on the 
part of the Ménem government helped settle many of the sectarian conflicts that had long 
festered within the UIA. 55 The UIA created a specialized department to address the concerns 
of small and medium industry, the Departamento PyMI, and the UIA also launched a 
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programme to gather detailed data on the performance of small firms, called the Observatorio 
PyMI. 
Despite the recent interest in small firms on behalf of the UIA, a number of factors make this 
organisation an unreliable representative. Most importantly, power is allocated in such a way 
as prevent the interests of small firms from becoming urgent priorities of the organisation. 
The members of the UIA, industrial chambers, remain dominated by larger firms. And 
because voting within the UIA is weighted by production, those sectors with the highest 
density of large firms retain control over the UIA’s agenda and political strategy. The result is 
a marked disjuncture between the research and analysis of the UIA and its positions on many 
key issues of public policy. The Departamento PyMI remains peripheral within the UIA, and 
the interests of small firms remain a low priority for the organisation.  
In many ways the case of Argentina reinforces some of the important lessons from the 
Mexico case, namely high costs (and potential downsides) of autonomy. But more 
significantly, the Argentina case suggests that the issue is not just the difficulties of collective 
action, for the standard barriers have indeed been overcome by various mechanisms by small 
firms throughout the post-war period. Rather, the issue is the lack of the state as a useful 
resource for organisational development, something of critical importance for weak actors. 
Each of these points – the difficulties of collective action, the inability of weak actors to 
punch through and attain access on their own, and the key role of the state as resource and 
potential ally – are brought to life even more in the case of Brazil. 
 
IV. Brazil: From Marginalisation to Representation 
Brazil is the only of the three countries where democratisation was accompanied by an 
increase in small firm representation. As elsewhere, patterns of business organisation in Brazil 
were also shaped by corporatism and the nature of the post-war policymaking regime. 
Although corporatism initially led to reduced representation, such that we could classify small 
industry representation in Brazil in the post-war decades as the least of the three cases, the 
persistence of corporatism in the current period has facilitated improvements in 
representation. Thus Brazil stands out in both the post-war and contemporary periods, for the 
least and most amounts of small industry representation, respectively.  
 
Rigid Corporatism and Small Business Exclusion 
The Brazilian corporatist framework emerged during the rule of Getulio Vargas (1930-
1945).56 The Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT) established a hierarchical network of 
organisations, with local, sectorally-defined sindicatos, to which membership was 
compulsory; state- level federations; and national, sectoral confederations. Within industry, the 
National Industrial Confederation (CNI) was formally at the peak of the hierarchy. Because of 
the importance of São Paulo industry, the Federation of Industry of the State of São Paulo 
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(FIESP) became the most important actor in the CNI and the leading representative of 
Brazilian capital.  
In contrast to Argentina, where business elites rejected (and ultimately abolished) 
corporatism, Brazilian business elites acquiesced to the corporatist constraints that emerged in 
the Vargas era. An important factor explaining these distinct reactions is that corporatism did 
not exacerbate intra-business conflicts, as it did in Argentina. Rather, the CLT was introduced 
with the principal objective of containing a growing labour movement. Much more then a 
framework for state-business interaction, the CLT was the cornerstone of the Brazilian system 
of industrial relations, in which the state sought to institutionalise industrial relations by 
channelling employer-employee conflicts through purportedly technical channels. Thus, 
workers were also channelled into a network of syndicates, federations, and confederations, 
and these official employer and employee organisations would be principally responsible for 
collective bargaining.57 
The importance of these very different origins and purposes of corporatism cannot be 
understated. Vargas did not impose corporatism on Brazilian business, but rather, after initial 
hostility in the early 1930s, the ensuing arrangements represent what one scholar has labelled 
a “gauging of forces” between the state and big business.58 In fact, the details of the 
corporatist framework in Brazil emerged out of negotiations between the Vargas government 
and leading business organisations. As a result, corporatism was much less threatening to 
business than in Argentina. The controls imposed on labour organisation and mobilization 
were significantly more limiting than those regarding employers: restrictions on union 
formation and activity were more onerous, workers had more difficulty forming associations 
outside of the corporatist framework, and when they did they were more easily suppressed.59 
Thus, business in Brazil would not adopt a strongly anti-corporatist position, for even after the 
Estado Novo terminated in 1945, leading sectors of Brazilian capital continued to benefit from 
and appreciate a corporatist system that brought labour control and minimized industrial 
conflict.60 
To be sure, many business leaders found the regulations on organisation to be bothersome and 
formed voluntary associations outside of the corporatist framework. As in Mexico, this 
process was most pronounced among larger firms, not so much because they found 
corporatism more bothersome but because of their greater capacity to form their own 
associations. In fact, the state encouraged this more narrow form of business collective action 
by working closely with reduced groups of businesses in the implementation of sectoral 
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policy initiatives, in what came to be called “bureaucratic rings”. 61 Ultimately, these 
associations provided Brazilian business elites with greater flexibility in dealing with the 
state.62 
In sum, because corporatism was not associated with an antithetical political project, and 
because corporatism was not imposed by the state on big bus iness but rather imposed by the 
state with big business, it did not engender the same backlash as it did in Argentina. So long 
as corporatism solved labour problems for Brazilian industrial elites and remained flexible 
enough to allow for the establishment of alternative mechanisms for interest representation, 
little effort would be made to abolish the CLT. 
While the reactions to corporatism distinguish Brazil from Argentina, the reactions within 
corporatism distinguish Brazil from Mexico. As indicated, many larger firms in both Brazil 
and Mexico created voluntary associations that operated alongside official corporatist 
organisations. Yet the relationship between the two types of organisations was different in the 
case of Brazil, where the mission of the vo luntary associations was to complement the 
corporatist organisations. In fact, a division of labour developed in Brazil, in which 
corporatist organisations addressed issues under the rubric of the CLT and voluntary 
associations specialized in sectoral, micro-economic areas. Thus, some scholars describe the 
relationship between the two types of organisations as “mutual strengthening”,63 while 
another refers to this as a “combined corporatist” arrangement.64  
The strategy of operating within the corporatist organisations while simultaneously creating 
alternative forms of representation was driven by the nature of the CLT, which endowed the 
legally-recognised syndicates, federations, and confederations with irreplaceable functions. 
Some activities remained outside of the competencies of the voluntary associations, 
particularly issues having to do with labour relations. Official business played key roles in 
Brazil’s system of industrial relations.65 Moreover, the creation of a National Industrial 
Training Service (SENAI) and Industrial Social Service (SESI) strengthened the official 
organisations by providing them with substantial financial resources to manage.66 
The complementary roles of these two different types of organisations gave industrial elites 
something of a stake in both. As a result, even when large firms formed their own voluntary 
associations, they did not entirely abandon the official organisations. On the contrary, the 
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corporatist organisations and the parallel voluntary associations tended to share office space 
and administrative personnel, and they usually had the same leadership.67  
The ensuing pattern of business organisation had important implications for small industry. 
As emphasized, corporatism in Brazil was more constraining for labour then business – but 
within the business sector corporatism was significantly more limiting for small firms. Small 
industrialists were less able to create their own associations outside of the corporatist 
framework: they were encumbered by the standard problems of collective action, and they 
were not on the receiving end of selective incentives in the form of participation in the 
‘bureaucratic rings’. Nor were small firms successful in attaining leadership positions in and 
control over the official organisations.68 The combination of small firms’ difficulties in 
creating associations outside of the corporatist framework and inability to commandeer 
official organisations within the corporatist framework meant that the weaker segment of 
national industry would not have its own organisation in Brazil. 
For comparative purposes, it is worth recalling the process by which small manufacturing 
firms came to control CANACINTRA in Mexico. These firms did not displace large firms. 
Rather, they gained control over the chamber as large firms abandoned it upon creating 
separate sector-specific organisations. Business corporatism in Mexico gave official 
organisations but a single role, that of representation. To the extent that large firms could 
secure representation outside of the corporatist framework, which they could, and to the 
extent that the large firms could organise without the benefit of compulsory membership, 
which they could as well, official organisations such as CANACINTRA served little purpose 
to them. Were large firms to have retained an interest in CANACINTRA, positions of 
leadership would almost certainly have been out of the reach of small firms here as well. In 
Brazil, a very different and more substantial role for the corporatist bodies meant that such a 
process of abandonment made much less sense. In neither country did the corporatist 
frameworks call for organisations officially dedicated to small industry, but in Brazil, a 
pattern of association that did not include size-based abandonment meant that such an 
organisation was much less likely to emerge. The result was that small firms, less able to 
create organisations outside of the corporatist framework, remained comparatively more 
marginalized within the corporatist framework.69 
  
The State and the Seeds of Representation in Contemporary Brazil 
In the aftermath of a long period of military rule (1964-1985), the late 1980s and early 1990s 
was a time of renewed political mobilisation on the part of Brazilian business.70 This period 
witnessed a variety of projects to reconstitute patterns of business representation. For 
example, the Union of Brazilian Businessmen (UBE) was formed as an economy-wide body 
to lobby the national constituent assembly that was designing the constitution for the “New 
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Republic”. 71 In addition, a group of small and medium firms in the National Thought of the 
Business Bases (PNBE) attempted to change the role and orientation of FIESP.72 And a 
handful of Brazil’s largest and most influential firms attempted to create a new organisation, 
the Institute for Industrial Development Studies (IEDI), which would actively promote a 
strategy of industrial promotion. 73 
Despite the proliferation of organisational initiatives, scholars of Brazilian business tend to 
agree that these efforts had minimal impact on preva iling arrangements for business 
representation. Many of the key features of post-war business politics remain in effect. 
Business-government interaction has continued to be marked by the “combined corporatist” 
arrangements, featuring a hybrid system with official organisations and voluntary associations 
operating side-by-side.74  
Underscoring continuity in patterns of interaction is continuity in institutional form. A key 
feature of contemporary Brazilian business politics is the endurance of corporatist regulations. 
Though the new constitution eliminated some of the more controlling aspects of the labour 
corporatism, most elements of the Vargas-era CLT were preserved in the course of 
democratisation. 75 With regard to business, this meant that compulsory membership, the 
official role of syndicates and federations, and the fairly rigid division of tasks within and 
among the official and voluntary organisations, have remained important aspects of the 
institutional environment in Brazil.  
One reason for the endurance of Brazilian corporatism remains its distinct institutional design, 
that the CLT addresses both capital and labour. Changing business corporatism is more costly 
in Brazil, for it implies changes to the national labour code and the entire system of industrial 
relations. Indeed, reforming labour law is a complex and politically charged issue in many 
developing countries. In Mexico, for example, while the 1941 Chambers Law (the business-
side of corporatism) was repealed in 1997, the Federal Labour Law of 1929 remained in effect 
throughout the democratic transition. But the option of changing corporatism in one arena but 
not the other is not available in Brazil, where the two sides of corporatism are fused.  
For all the attention given here to business corporatism, the constraints that corporatism 
places on labour play a more significant role in daily affairs of workers and in industrial 
relations more generally. As a result, there are more interests (for and against) and change is 
more complex. That is a general rule. The point here is that because corporatism for business 
and labour are linked in Brazil, the easier change is impeded by the more difficult change. 
Thus, despite occasional initiatives to revise the CLT, both business and labour have been 
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generally reluctant to entertain fundamental changes to Brazilian corporatism, such as 
compulsory membership.76 
The persistence of corporatism has had decidedly mixed implications for small industry 
representation. Not surprisingly, small business representation outside of official channels 
remains extraordinarily difficult. A wide of range of voluntary associations have emerged 
throughout civil society in democratic Brazil, and small business associations have 
undeniably been part of this general tendency. 77 The National Movement of Small and 
Medium Firms (MONAMPE), to provide but one example, has constituted itself throughout 
most of Brazil’s states. Yet such organisations are not well integrated into national politics: 
they can perform advocacy roles, but because they lack legal standing within the fairly rigid 
corporatist framework, they suffer from lack of access to important policymaking arenas. 
With sustained collective action an uphill struggle, these organisations’ continued existence 
depends on the tireless work and the limited resources of a handful of activists. 
Likewise, many instances of small firm collective action within corporatist organisations have 
continued to be blocked. Nylen’s observations regarding the difficult passage to leadership 
still appears to be accurate.78 The case of the PNBE’s frustrated and unsuccessful effort to 
capture control of FIESP in the late 1980s and early 1990s certainly illustrates the obstacles 
that small firms confront in securing representation within the corporatist framework. On 
account of their ‘insubordination’ many PNBE members were removed from their positions 
within FIESP, and after being beaten back in the Federation’s 1992 elections the movement 
withered away. 79  
Importantly, however, the persistence of corporatism regulations has also had a positive effect 
on small industry representation in contemporary Brazil. The most successful and enduring 
movement has emerged within the corporatist framework, with the creation in 1990 of an 
official Syndicate for Micro and Small Industry in the State of São Paulo (SIMPI). Though 
FIESP, on behalf of the member syndicates, strongly resisted the creation of this new 
organisation, SIMPI challenged the Federation in court and eventually prevailed.80 According 
to the terms of agreement reached between the Federation and the new syndicate, all micro 
and small industrial firms in the state of São Paulo could choose which syndicate to join, a 
sectoral-based organisation, SIMPI, or both. 81 For the first time, Brazil would have an 
organisation specially dedicated to small firms that operated within the regulations of the 
CLT. 
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The contrast between the success of SIMPI and the failure of the effort to create a separate 
chamber in Mexico for capital goods and metalworking producers reinforces the importance 
of collective action in unoccupied vs. occupied space.82 In Brazil, no organisation within the 
corporatist framework had the role of representing small firms. SIMPI was not attempting to 
displace any existing organisation. SIMPI takes some firms away from some existing 
syndicates, but it does not directly and massively affect any single organisation. In Mexico, in 
contrast, CANACINTRA already represented firms in the capital goods and metalworking 
sectors. The existence of a new chamber in those sectors would have gutted CANACINTRA’s 
membership. In both cases official organisations attempted to block the initiative, but the case 
for doing so in Mexico was significantly stronger. 
As expected, SIMPI’s official status has allowed it to overcome many of the difficulties that 
beleaguered small firm collective action in the New Republic. SIMPI has a vote within 
FIESP, and official status provides SIMPI with privileged access to government commissions 
and policymaking boards. Such access, of course, is an incentive that encourages 
participation. Corporatism also stabilizes the organisation’s membership base. Though 
SIMPI’s founder and president insists that the organisation does not accept the syndicate 
tax,83 the obligation to join nevertheless makes SIMPI less vulnerable to oscillations in 
membership. Stable membership, in turn, makes investment in services more feasible and less 
risky: SIMPI is less likely to encounter the grave problems that CANACINTRA experienced 
in the 1990s, when it invested in services at a time of declining membership. Thus, operating 
within the corporatist framework, over the course of the 1990s SIMPI continued to grow. 
With thousands of members the new organisation gained an increasingly important role in 
Brazilian political economy. SIMPI represents small firms on key issues in the state (and city) 
of São Paulo, and, importantly, it is regularly consulted by policymakers in Brasilia as well. 
To be sure, SIMPI’s representative capacity is limited in important respects. It lacks genuine 
national reach, as it is remains based almost entirely in São Paulo. SIMPI established similar 
organisations in other states, bringing them together under a national association (ASIMPI), 
but in no state has the success of São Paulo been replicated. Even more problematic is that 
SIMPI is limited to small and micro firms, as its name suggests. Medium-sized firms do not 
have the option of joining SIMPI, and no similar official organisation within the corporatist 
structure has emerged for such firms. These qualifications and limitations notwithstanding, 
the presence and role of SIMPI – and the trajectory of increasing representation – makes 
Brazil stand out among the three countries examined here. The persistence of corporatism has 
enhanced small firm representation. 
An additional example of increased small business representation in Brazil, at the district 
level, reinforces the lessons derived from case of SIMPI. In the tiny municipality of São João 
do Aruaru, in the northern state of Ceará, small producers of wooden furniture formed a local 
association that gained an important role in local economic governance, helping state officials 
implement an innovative procurement programme and monitoring the performance of the 
firms that were involved.84 Importantly, the emergence and stability of this association, the 
Aruaru Association of Furniture-Makers, is owed to the active encouragement and help of 
local government officials. As Tendler explains, local officials extended incentives to help 
these small firms create this association and thereby build local constituencies for the 
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procurement programme. Organised, small firms were then able to be formally included on 
the state’s Industrial Council, for the first time in the state’s history. 85 Here too, small industry 
representation increased not in spite of but rather on account of the state. 
 
V. Conclusion: Democratisation, the State, and Small Industry Representation 
What are the most important points to be taken from this comparison of business interest 
organisation in Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil? First, it is clear that an open, unrestricted, and 
pluralist field of interest articulation, where firms are free to organize as they wish, is likely to 
be captured by associations dominated by larger firms that invest resources in establishing 
and sustaining such organisations. Small firms, in contrast, have more difficulty taking 
advantage of the new opportunities for interest articulation that emerge in the course of 
democratisation. Pluralism and democratisation are as likely to generate fragmentation then 
collective action.  
The comparative analysis also demonstrates the importance of the state. Even where the 
obstacles to collective action are overcome, as appears to the case in Argentina with APYME, 
the lack of reliable access to the state can distort these small organisations’ development by 
depriving them of incentives to build internal arrangements for coordinating and aggregating 
members’ interests. Significantly, APYME, like ANIT, dedicates more resources towards 
coalition-building and social protest then towards improving its capacity as small firm 
representative. Thus, the comparative analysis suggests that Schneider’s observation 
regarding big business, that lack of state support can produce low levels of organisational 
development, is relevant for small firms as well.86  
In contrast to the cases of Argentina and Mexico, which point to the effects of state neglect, in 
Brazil we see how state attention can help small firms organize and secure more reliable 
representation. Producers in both São Paulo and Ceará have benefited from state concessions. 
Yet the Brazilian case also demonstrates that the form of organisational support need not be 
corporatism per se. Though small firms in São Paulo benefited from compulsory membership 
delivered through corporatism, it was a different form of state support that facilitated 
collective action and organisational development among furniture producers in the district of 
Aruaru. In this case the selective incentive for collective action was not compulsory 
membership, but participation in designing and implementing the government’s procurement 
programme. 
The comparative analysis thus suggests a re-evaluation of the political role of the state. To be 
sure, dependence on the state can distort interest representation, as clearly occurred in Mexico 
in the 1980s and part of the 1990s. But the absence of the state hardly appears to improve 
representation. Small firms would do well to distinguish between the state as a source of 
political control and the state as an ally that may allow them to overcome some basic political 
handicaps and be integrated into local and national politics. More generally, the analysis here 
points to the important role of the state in improving the quality of democracy by facilitating 
collective action and encouraging the development of richer and more substantial 
associational life. 
To conclude, it is worth returning to the issue set out at the top of the paper, the increased 
attention that analysts of economic development place on small firms. Small manufacturers 
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can make important contributions to economic development.87 Most obviously, smaller and 
more labour- intensive firms can serve as an engine of job creation and thus address the 
serious problems of underemployment. Many economies in Latin America suffer from a 
problem of insufficient job creation, what the Economic Commission on Latin America has 
labeled the “Achilles’ Heel” of the neoliberal reforms.88 In the context of growing population 
and expanding labour markets, and with investment concentrated in capital- intensive and 
natural resource-intensive sectors, even economies that have experienced growth have 
remained encumbered by persistent underemployment. Smaller, labour- intensive firms can 
generate jobs.  
Under appropriate conditions, small industrial firms can also serve as mechanisms of 
industrial integration. The extent to which larger final goods producers operating in global 
markets use locally produced inputs, rather than imported inputs, has important 
developmental implications. Most obviously, import- intensive industrialisation, be it under 
developmentalism or neoliberalism, increases dependence on capital inflows and, 
subsequently, vulnerability to external financial shocks. In Mexico, for example, the import-
content of exports is greater than 70 percent. However, the ability of larger firms to source 
locally while remaining competitive internationally depends in great part on the availability 
and quality of local suppliers. We generally might not expect tiny micro-enterprises to fit into 
larger production chains, but integrated industrial development requires that small- and 
medium-sized firms have such capacity. 89  
A development strategy that promotes employment creation and industrial integration requires 
that attention be paid to small firms, for how such firms adjust to economic competition has 
wide-ranging implications. To the extent that neoliberalism leads small industrial firms to idle 
capacity, to lay off workers, and relegates them to simple, non-dynamic activities, the 
consequences are felt in terms of employment (hence poverty and equity) and industrial 
integration (hence vulnerability to external shocks). 
However, the potential contributions of small firms to economic development are unlikely to 
be realized without adequate representation. Understanding why gets to the heart of the 
themes developed in this paper. While responding to the needs of small firms is technically 
feasible, it involves political trade-offs – doing so may bring small industrialists into conflict 
with other actors with different preferences. Small firm assistance implies budgetary 
reallocations (in terms of outlays and patterns of government procurement), potentially new 
taxes, and sometimes even new regulations on larger firms. Thus, it is essential that we 
consider the capacity of small industrialists to construct durable and reliable mechanisms of 
representation that can articulate and defend their interests in the public arena. Doing so, 
critically, reorients analys is of small industry development away from a technocratic 
discussion of policies and towards, more appropriately, politics. 
The importance of representation is illustrated with brief consideration of the small business 
programmes initiated in the 1990s in Latin America. Virtually all governments throughout the 
region recognize the importance of small firms and have introduced measures with the stated 
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goals of helping small firms adjust to international competition. 90 But with minimal 
representation from below, it is not surprising that small enterprise development programmes 
in Latin America have aimed more towards correcting market failures, reducing information 
gaps, and teaching business administration than towards actively promoting industrial 
integration. Because activist programmes divert more resources they create more political 
opposition, which suggests they are less likely to go forward without representation from 
below. Someone has to demand these policies, not just on the street corner or even in the 
hallways of congress, but in the rooms and at the tables where small business policies are 
designed and negotiated.  
But the problem with small industry policy in the region has not just been the predominance 
of the non-activist approach, but also an inability to maximize the possibilities even with the 
prevailing correcting-market- failure approach. That is, contemporary programmes have 
suffered from a chronic lack of resources and lack of commitment on the part of the 
governments.91 Stronger political advocacy – the existence of durable and reliable small 
business representatives – can protect these programmes’ resources and monitor results. 
Representation could break the pattern of new initiatives being introduced, starved of 
resources, abandoned, and then replaced with yet new initiatives. Again, the case of Ceará is 
instructive, for the local association of furniture makers played an important role in 
attempting to protect the resources dedicated to the government procurement programme.92 
The discussion of representation and small business policy has particular relevance for 
contemporary discussions of participatory policymaking and state-societal synergies. 
Successful cases of market-completing second-generation reforms have featured the creation 
of national- and local- level networks of state-societal participation. 93 Whereas those who 
emphasized rent-seeking sought to minimize state-societal interaction, a new development 
paradigm at the dawn of the 21st Century has come to appreciate and value precisely such 
interaction. 94 Yet the creation of such participatory networks depends not just on the 
incentives that state officials have to include ‘stakeholders’, but also on social actors’ 
capacities to participate. One of the fundamental problems with the current development 
discourse on participation is that it takes for granted the ability to participate. We need to take 
seriously the factors that affect actors’ ability to collaborate constructively with the state in 
the making and implementation of policy.  
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